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The Journal of American History March 2005 impersonal market forces. In fact, the remedies themselves became the cause of our problems, creating resentment among whites, subverting self-reliance among blacks, and encouraging "balkanization" when nationalism and assimilation should be our goals."1 It was up to color-blind conservatives to restore the original purpose of civil rights laws, which was to prevent isolated acts of wrongdoing against individuals, rather than, as many civil rights activists and legal experts claimed, to redress present, institutionalized manifestations of historical injustices against blacks as a group.12 Germinated in well-funded right-wing think tanks and broadcast to the general public, this racial narrative had wide appeal, in part because it conformed to white, middle-class interests and flattered national vanities and in part because it resonated with ideals of individual effort and merit that are widely shared. The American creed of free-market individualism, in combination with the ideological victories of the movement (which ensured that white supremacy must "hide its face"), made the rhetoric of color blindness central to the "war of ideas" initiated by the New Right in the 1970s. With Ronald Reagan's presidential victory in 1980, and even more so after the Republican sweep of Congress in 1994, that rhetoric entrenched itself in public policy. Dovetailing with the retreat from race-specific remedies among centrist liberals, it crossed traditional political boundaries, and it now shapes the thinking of "a great many people of good will."'3 "11 Proponents of this new racial orthodoxy differ in tone and, to a lesser extent, in ideas. I am stressing the interventions of those who present themselves as the voice of the reasoned, informed center or as "racial realists," in Alan Wolfe's phrase. I refer to them as "new conservatives" or "color-blind conservatives." For racial realism, see Alan Wolfe, "Enough Blame to Go Around," New York Times Book Review, June 12, 1998, p. 12; Philip Klinkner, "The 'Racial Realism' Hoax," Nation, Dec. 14, 1998, pp. 33-38; "Letters," ibid., Jan. 25, 1999, p. 24; and Michael K. Brown Clearly, the stories we tell about the civil rights movement matter; they shape how we see our own world. "Facts" must be interpreted, and those interpretations-narrated by powerful storytellers, portrayed in public events, acted upon in laws and policies and court decisions, and grounded in institutions-become primary sources of human action. Those who aspire to affect public opinion and policy and thus to participate in "the endless struggle over our collective destiny" must always ask themselves not only "which stories to advance, contest, and accept as 'true'" but also how to discipline those stories with research and experience and to advance them with power. In the world of symbolic politics, the answers to those questions determine who will prevail.14 In that spirit, I will turn now to a story of my own-the story of the long civil rights movement and of the resistance to it. Throughout, I will draw on the work of a wide range of historians, tying together stories usually told separately in order to alter common understandings of the black freedom struggle (and of how we arrived at the dilemmas of the new millennium) in at least six major ways. First, this new, longer and broader narrative undermines the trope of the South as the nation's "opposite other," an image that southernizes racism and shields from scrutiny both the economic dimensions of southern white supremacy and the institutionalized patterns of exploitation, segregation, and discrimination in other regions of the country-patterns that survived the civil rights movement and now define the South's racial landscape as well. Second, this narrative emphasizes the gordian knot that ties race to class and civil rights to workers' rights. Third, it suggests that women's activism and gender dynamics were central both to the freedom movement and to the backlash against it. Fourth, it makes visible modern civil rights struggles in the North, Midwest, and West, which entered a new phase with the turn to black nationalism in the mid-1960s but had begun at least a quarter century before. Fifth, it directs attention to the effort to "make use of the reforms won by the civil rights movement" in the 1970s, after the national movement's alleged demise.15 And finally, it construes the Reagan-Bush ascendancy not simply as a backlash against the "movement of movements" of the late 1960s and 1970s, but as a development with deep historical roots.
The Long Backlash
Two great internal migrations gave rise both to the long civil rights movement and to the interests and ideologies that would ultimately feed the most telling resistance to it: the exodus of African Americans to the cities of the South, North, and West precipitated by the collapse of the southern sharecropping system and the mass suburbanization of whites. Accelerating during World War II, those vast relocations of people and resources transformed the racial geography of the country. Each responded to and acted on the other. They were fatefully, although often invisibly, entwined.'6 Gender, class, region, and race all shaped both migration experiences. Because discrimination in the North shunted black men into the meanest factory jobs, women carried the burden of a double day. Relegated mainly to domestic service, they combined wage earning not only with homemaking but with kin work and social networking, practices that were rooted in the folk and family traditions of the South, bound neighborhoods together, and provided the safety net that discriminatory welfare policies denied. Such networks also helped to blur urban-rural boundaries, ensuring that struggles in the city and the countryside would be mutually reinforcing. '7 As rural black folk grappled with the planter-dominated policies and practices that exploited their labor and drove them from the land, urban migrants fought to "keep Mississippi out of California" and the "plantation mentality" out of the cities of the South.'8 Indeed, the resonance of the plantation metaphor for blacks throughout the country suggests the depth and durability of rural memories and interregional connections. In one sense, however, the metaphor is misleading. For black migrants who made their way to the "promised land" found themselves confronting not Mississippi in California but indigenous forms of discrimination and de facto segregation-the result not of custom, as "de facto" implies, but of a combination of individual choices and governmental policies (some blatant and some race neutral on their face) that had the effect, and often the intent, of barring African Americans from access to decent jobs, schools, and homes, as well as to the commercialized leisure spaces that increasingly symbolized "making it in America" for white ethnics en route to the middle class.
Ironically, New Deal programs helped to erect those racial barriers. In tandem with the higher wages won by the newly empowered unions of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (clo), the expansion of the welfare state mitigated the terrible insecurity of working-class life for blacks and whites alike. Yet the "gendered" and "raced" imagination of New Deal reformers also built racial and gender inequality into the very foundation of the modern state.'9 Those inequalities were intensified by 16 On the reshaping of cities by the two internal migrations, see Robert O. Self and Thomas J. Sugrue One manifestation of systemic inequality was a two-track welfare system rooted in a "family wage" ideal that figured the worker as a full-time breadwinner who supported children and a dependent, non-wage-earning wife at home-an ideal from which most people of color were excluded. When unemployment insurance was enacted in 1935, for example, it did not extend to agricultural and domestic workers, whom reformers did not see as independent, full-time breadwinners, and on whom the South's low-wage economy depended. As a result, 55 percent of all African American workers and 87 percent of all wage-earning African American women were excluded from one of the chief benefits of the New Deal. In lieu of such protections, African Americans were dependent on-and stigmatized by-the stingy, meanstested programs known as "welfare" today.20
As metropolitan populations exploded, a mad scramble for housing brought African Americans face to face with another limitation of the New Deal: white men benefited disproportionately from the G.I. Bill of Rights, a mammoth social welfare program for returning veterans passed by Congress at the end of World War II. In combination with an equally ambitious housing program, the G.I. Bill drew aspiring ethnic workers and the white middle class out of the city, away from black neighbors, and into ever-expanding suburban rims. Centuries of racial denigration, compounded by divisions built into the two-track welfare system, predisposed white urbanites to fear black migrants. But what came to be known as "white flight" was caused not just by individual attitudes but also by a panoply of profit-and government-driven policies. Local zoning boards and highway building choices equated "black" with "blight," frightening away white buyers and steering investment away from black urban neighborhoods. Blockbusting real estate agents stampeded whites into selling cheap and blacks into buying dear. Redlining banks denied mortgages to African Americans and to buyers in "mixed" neighborhoods. Most important, the Federal Housing Administration pursued lending policies that not only favored but practically mandated racial homogeneity. Encouraged by tax incentives, highway building programs, and a desire to outflank the new unions, factories and businesses moved to the suburbs as well, eroding the cities' tax base, damaging infrastructure, and eviscerating municipal services. The growth of segregated suburbs also exacerbated the trend toward almost complete segregation in urban schools. The practice of supporting public education through local taxes and the fiercely guarded divide between urban and suburban school districts, combined with conscious, racially motivated choices regarding the siting of schools and the assignment of pupils, relegated black migrants to schools that were often as separate and as unequal as those they had left behind.22
This cascading process of migration, job discrimination, suburbanization, and race-coded New Deal reform had three major effects. First, over the course of the 1940s race became increasingly spatialized, rendering invisible to whites the accumulated race and class privileges that undergirded what suburbanites came to see as the rightful fruits of their own labor. Second, the "suburban frontier" spawned a new homeowners' politics based on low taxes, property rights, neighborhood autonomy, and a shrinking sense of social responsibility, all of which became entangled with racial identity in ways that would prove extremely difficult to undo.23 Finally, African Americans, already burdened by the social and economic deprivations of slavery and Jim Crow, found themselves disadvantaged by employment practices and state policies that amounted to affirmative action for whites. In a society where a home represented most families' single most important asset, for example, differential access to mortgages and housing markets and the racial valuation of neighborhoods translated into enormous inequalities. Passed on from generation to generation, those inequalities persist to this day. Short-circuiting the generational accumulation of wealth and social capital that propelled other ethnic minorities into the expanding post-World War II middle class, those policies left a legacy of racial inequality that has yet to be seriously addressed.24
Southern Strategies
We now have a copious literature on postwar suburbanization and the deepening of segregation in the North and West. But too often, the already segregated, rural, backward South figures in this story only as a footnote or an exception to the rule. In fact, because southern cities grew up in the age of New Deal reform, the automobile, and suburban sprawl, the modern South might better be seen as a paradigm.25
Looking back from the perspective of the dominant narrative, it is easy to see a peculiar system of legal segregation as the South's defining feature. But spatial separation was never the white South's major goal. Black and white southerners engaged in constant and nuanced interactions, moderated by personal ties, economic interests, and class and gender dynamics and marked by cultural exchange.26 Taking place as they did within a context of racial hierarchy, those interactions did not diminish segregation's perniciousness and power. Yet given the ubiquity of black-white contact and the crucial role of blacks as a source of cheap labor, what we think of as the age of segregation might better be called the age of "racial capitalism," for segregation was only one instrument of white supremacy, and white supremacy entailed not only racial domination but also economic practices. Pursued by an industrial and agricultural oligarchy to aggrandize themselves and forward a particular development strategy for the region, those practices involved low taxes, minimal investment in human capital, the separation and political immobilization of the black and white southern poor, the exploitation of non-unionized, undereducated black and white labor, and the patriarchal control of families and local institutions.27
That strategy created a particularly brutal and openly racialized social system, especially in the Deep South. But its basic doctrines-racial and class subordination, limited government regulation, a union-free workplace, and a racially divided working class-dovetailed seamlessly with an ethic of laissez-faire capitalism rooted deeply in American soil.28 This is not to minimize regional differences. It is, however, to suggest that the further we move away from the campaigns that overturned the South's distinctive system of state-sponsored segregation, the easier it is to see the broader and ultimately more durable patterns of privilege and exploitation that were American, not southern, in their origins and consequences. 25 For the argument that the South "traveled almost directly from the countryside to suburbia" and that "the southern city became the quintessential suburban city," see Those common patterns meant that the South's postwar prosperity could narrow regional differences without eliminating racial gaps. Change began in earnest in the 1940s and accelerated in the 1950s and 1960s, as southern Democrats, responding selectively to the activist New Deal state (rather than opposing it, as observers often assume), used their congressional seniority to garner a disproportionate share of defense spending while demanding local and state control over federal programs for housing, hospital construction, education, and the like. That strategy helped raise wages and triple regional incomes in the 1940s, but it also blunted federal antidiscrimination efforts.29 At the same time, southern industrialists, like their counterparts in other regions, reacted to rising wages and to the labor militancy that followed World War II by installing laborsaving machinery and eliminating the jobs held by blacks, while whites monopolized the new skilled and white-collar jobs, which demanded qualifications denied to blacks by both educational inequities and discriminatory practices that barred them from learning on the job. Thus even as the South prospered, racial disparities widened. 30 Much of the South's new technical and managerial work force, moreover, was imported from the urban North. Before World War II, the chief goal of most southern politicians was to maintain the South's isolation and the captive labor supply on which the sharecropping system depended. Afterward, boosterism became these leaders' raison d'tre and "the selling of the South" began. Low corporate taxes, low welfare benefits, and "look-the-other-way environmental policies," coupled with federally financed highway-building campaigns, attracted northern industry and an influx of northern-born, Republican-bred branch managers, supervisors, and technicians.31 Those newcomers settled with their southern-born counterparts in class-and race-marked enclaves created by the same ostensibly race-neutral public policies that spatialized race in the North. With mushrooming suburbanization came the attitudes and advantages that would undergird the South's version of homeowner politics-the politics of the long backlash everywhere. Richard M. Nixon's "southern strategy," which attacked welfare, busing, and affirmative action in order to bring white southerners into the Republican fold, targeted such voters: middle-class suburbanites, including skilled workers from outside the South and young families who had come of age after the Brown decision and were uncomfortable with the openly racist rhetoric of massive resistance. Aimed also at white workers in the urban North, that strategy helped make the South a chief stronghold of the Republican party as, 29 Left-led unions; the return of black veterans-all taken together "generated a rights consciousness that gave working-class black militancy a moral justification in some ways as powerful as that evoked by [Afro-Christianity] a generation later."39
International events deepened and broadened that consciousness. African Americans and their allies were among the first to grasp the enormity of the Nazi persecution of the Jews and to drive home the parallels between racism and anti-Semitism. In so doing, they used revulsion against the Holocaust to undermine racism at home and to "turn world opinion against Jim Crow." A "rising wind" of popular anticolonialism, inspired by the national liberation struggles in Africa and Asia that erupted after the war, also legitimized black aspirations and linked the denial of civil rights at home to the exploitation of the colonized peoples around the globe as well as to racially exclusive immigration and naturalization laws. as a violation of the "American" principle of "local self-government" by a "federal police state" reminiscent of the Soviet Union. By demonizing the Communists in the labor movement, conservatives also pushed the Taft-Hartley Act through Congress. Under Taft-Hartley's restrictions, the cIo expelled its left-wing unions, tempered its fight for social welfare programs that would benefit the whole working class, and settled for an increasingly bureaucratized system of collective bargaining that secured higher wages and private welfare protections for its own members, mainly white male workers in heavy industries. Despite this so-called labor-management accord, American corporations remained fundamentally hostile toward both unions and the regulatory state, leaving even the workers who profited from the constricted collective bargaining system vulnerable to a renewed corporate offensive in the 1970s and 1980s, an offensive that, in combination with economic stagnation, deindustrialization, and automation, would cripple the trade-union movement for years to come.43
To be sure, even as domestic anticommunism helped drive labor to the right and weaken civil rights unionism's institutional base, it gave civil rights advocates a potent weapon: the argument that the United States' treatment of its black citizens undermined its credibility abroad. At a time when the State Department was laboring to draw a stark contrast between American democracy and Soviet terror, win the allegiance of the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa, and claim leadership of the "free world," competition with the Soviet Union gave government officials a compelling reason to ameliorate black discontent and, above all, to manage the image of American race relations abroad. As a result, civil rights leaders who were willing to mute their criticism of American foreign policy and distance themselves from the Left gained a degree of access to the halls of power they had never had before. On balance, historians have emphasized the effectiveness of this strategy and viewed the movement's successes in the 1950s as "at least in part a product of the Cold War."44 Seen through the optic of the long civil rights movement, however, civil rights look less like a product of the Cold War and more like a casualty.
That is so because antifascism and anticolonialism had already internationalized the race issue and, by linking the fate of African Americans to that of oppressed people everywhere, had given their cause a transcendent meaning. Anticommunism, on the other hand, stifled the social democratic impulses that antifascism and anticolonialism encouraged, replacing them with a Cold War racial liberalism that, at best, failed to deliver on its promise of reform (with the partial exception of the judiciary, the federal government took no effective action throughout the 1950s) and, at worst, colluded with the right-wing red scare to narrow the ideological ground on which civil rights activists could stand. To take just one example: Both left-wing and centrist black leaders seized the opportunity offered by the 1945 founding of the United Nations (UN) to define the plight of African Americans as a "human rights" issue, a In the South, perhaps more than anywhere else in the country, the Cold War destroyed Popular Front institutions and diverted the civil rights movement into new channels. When the so-called classical phase of the movement erupted in the late 1950s and 1960s, it involved blacks and whites, southerners and northerners, local people and federal officials, secularists and men and women of faith. It also extended far beyond the South, and throughout the country it drew on multiple, competing ideological strands. But on the ground, in the South, the movement's ability to rally participants, stymie its enemies, and break through the fog of the Cold War came largely from the prophetic tradition within the black church. Cold War liberals counseled patience while countering international criticism by suggesting that racism was not woven into American institutions; it was limited to the South, a retrograde region that economic development would eventually bring into line with an otherwise democratic nation. By contrast, southern civil rights activists, mobilizing the latent themes of justice and deliverance in an otherworldly religion, demanded "freedom now," not gradual, top-down amelioration. That prophetic vision gave believers the courage to engage history as an ongoing process of reconstruction, to risk everything for ideals they might never see fulfilled.48
Those ideals have often been misconstrued, not only by those on the right who reduce them to color blindness but also by those on the left who stress the southern movement's limitations. In their zeal to make up for inattention to the freedom struggle in the North and West, for instance, urban historians sometimes draw a misleading contrast between a northern embrace of economics and black power and a southern commitment to a minimalist program of interracialism and integration. That dichotomy ignores both the long history of nonviolent struggles against segregation in the North and the fact that black southerners were schooled in a quest both for access and for self-determination that dated back to emancipation, a quest that called forth strategies ranging from tactical alliances across the color line, to the building of separate institutions, to migration, to economic boycotts and direct action.49 In both regions, the success of the movement depended not just on idealism and courage, but on a keen understanding and ready use of the fulcrums of power.
There was, moreover, nothing minimalist about dismantling Jim Crow, a system built as much on economic exploitation as on de jure and de facto spatial separation. In the minds of movement activists, integration was never about "racial mingling" or "merely sitting next to whites in school," as it is sometimes caricatured now.50 Nor did it imply assimilation into static white-defined institutions, however much whites assumed that it did. True integration was and is an expansive and radical goal, not an ending or abolition of something that once was-the legal separation of bodies by race-but a process of transforming institutions and building an equitable, democratic, multiracial, and multiethnic society.1
The 1963 March on Washington, which came at the height of what figures in the dominant narrative as the good, color-blind movement, is a case in point. Today's conservatives make much of Martin Luther King's dream that "children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character." But virtually nothing in the dominant narrative would lead us to expect an image of the march that showed women carrying signs demanding jobs for all, decent housing, fair pay, and equal rights "NO1.," thus asserting both their racial solidarity and their identities as activists and workers and thereby the equals of men.52 As layoffs skyrocketed, moreover, increasing numbers of white male workers, influenced by conservatives' pseudopopulist claims, blamed affirmative action, despite conclusive evidence that employers' efforts to hire and promote blacks and women did not lead to significant "reverse discrimination." As Thomas Sugrue has noted, "Long-term economic restructuring was inscrutable to most white workers. But affirmative action was an easy target"-in part because powerful stories and storytellers made it so.73 The struggle for the equal rights amendment and abortion rights had a similar impact on some working-class wives. Dependent on men in an atmosphere of deepening economic insecurity and inundated with New Right attacks on the women's movement as an antifamily, elitist plot, they opposed reform in part out of fear that feminism would "free men first," leaving women with no claim to male protection and support. 74 These developments helped to propel the New Right to power and encouraged the Reagan administration's efforts to gut antidiscrimination enforcement mechanisms. This deregulation of the labor market forwarded a resurgence of antiblack discrimination based on "hidden preferences and stereotypes" that are well documented but almost impossible to prove and thus helped reverse almost two decades of black economic gains.75 Still, as Nancy MacLean argues, the right wing's triumph was by no means complete, in part because Reagan's efforts aroused a storm of opposition from call progress" without coming to terms with the past.79 That lack of accounting opens the way to a color-blind conservatism that is breathtakingly ahistorical and blind to social facts. It impoverishes public discourse, discourages investment in public institutions, and undermines our will to address the inequalities and injustices that surround us now.
The narratives spun by the new conservatives maintain a strong hold on the public imagination, in part because they have been repeated so often and broadcast so widely, and in part because they avoid uncomfortable questions about the relationship between cumulative white advantage and present social ills. Yet there is reason to hope that countervailing stories could make themselves heard and could even, under the right circumstances, prevail. Opinion poll after poll indicates that white racial attitudes have changed dramatically since World War II, that support for the principles of integration and equal treatment remains high (even as approval of governmental intervention to accomplish those goals has declined), and that most white as well as black Americans continue to favor the keystones of the New Deal order."8 Those attitudes should not be underestimated. They do not mean that hidden or even overt biases have disappeared or that sedimented, institutional inequalities have been eliminated. But they are the ground in which new understandings of today's problems can take root. Those understandings must grapple both with history, which explodes the notion that racial disparities are caused by black failings, and with the abundant evidence that the distress of people of color today is indeed "the first sign of a danger that threatens us all." That danger-whose signs range from the everyfamily-for-itself scramble for "good schools" to the high cost of "prisons, police, mopping-up health care services, and other reactive measures"-if amplified by public storytellers, could combine with antiracist principles to create a climate in which fresh solutions to social problems can emerge. 81 Historians can and must play a central role in a struggle that turns so centrally on understanding the legacy of the past. But how can we make ourselves heard without reducing history to the formulaic mantras on which political narratives usually rely? To tell our stories both truly and effectively, we need modes of writing and speaking that emphasize individual agency, the sine qua non of narrative, while also dramatizing the hidden history of policies and institutions-the publicly sanctioned choices
